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Abstract: It is widely held that more productive firms grow faster, thus reallocating resources
and raising aggregate productivity. Yet little empirical research identifies the features of the
mechanisms affecting this process. This paper develops and tests a general model
encompassing several mechanisms used to overcome informational frictions to growth. We
find that firm size, productivity dispersion, and large firm investments in intangibles are all
significantly related to changes in firm growth in response to productivity. These factors can
account for much of the decline in the response to productivity since 2000 (Decker et al.
2020). Also, industry concentration is directly related to aggregate productivity growth.
JEL codes: L13, L15, D22, D24
Keywords: information technology, productivity growth, firm growth, industry
concentration
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Introduction
Schumpeter asserted that competition in the form of “creative destruction,” is “the
powerful lever that in the long run expands output and brings down prices” (1942, 85).
Firms with new technologies or better sources of supply or superior organizations grow and
displace incumbents, bringing the benefits of higher productivity. Large theoretical and
empirical literatures draw on Schumpeterian ideas regarding innovation, firm growth and
survival, productivity, and economic growth (for a partial review see Cohen 2010). The link
between aggregate productivity growth and reallocation to more productive firms is wellestablished (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan 2001). The dynamic impact of competition on
innovation and subsequent productivity growth also features centrally in the literature on
competition policy (Gilbert 2006; Shapiro 2011).
Yet relatively little empirical research has detailed the specific mechanisms by which
more productive firms grow and eventually displace market incumbents. This paper presents
an empirical model that identifies key factors affecting how firm growth responds to
productivity and we test the role of these factors in a broad sample of firms.
Understanding just how productivity relates to firm growth is important for two
reasons. First, it can help explain recent shifts in the reallocation to productive firms—
Decker et al. (2020) find that firms grow more slowly in response to productivity shocks
since 2000 and that this slowdown substantially contributes to the slower growth of
aggregate productivity. Second, such analysis can shed light on the relationship between
competition and productivity growth. A large literature looks at the link between
competition and innovation incentives in industrial economies and the economics of
innovation (Cohen 2010 for a review), growth theory (Aghion and Griffith 2005; Aghion et
al. 2005), and policy (Gilbert 2006; Shapiro 2011). Yet incentives are only part of the story.
2
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They have little effect on aggregate productivity unless the innovation diffuses and/or the
firm grows. Evidence suggests that these things are not happening quickly or automatically.1
The problem is that firms do not immediately “disrupt” incumbents upon
introducing a highly productive innovation, as is sometimes assumed in the literature. The
reallocation literature finds that more productive firms grow somewhat faster than less
productive firms (and are less likely to exit) but this appears to be an extended process
(Caves 1998 provides a review). For instance, Foster et al. (2016) find that industry entrants
have greater technical efficiency than older firms, but much smaller size of demand. Demand
grows over time but this process extends for more than a decade at least (see also Dunne,
Roberts, and Samuelson 1988; Cabral and Mata 2003). In studies that look separately at the
effects of demand and of technical efficiency, it appears that differences in demand across
producers are the dominant factors affects firm growth and survival (Foster, Haltiwanger,
and Syverson 2008; 2016). It has long been recognized that demand adjusts slowly as seen,
for example, by differences between long-run and short-run demand elasticity.
But what factors affect the rate of this adjustment? A variety of theoretical models
attribute slow demand growth to informational frictions (Radner 2003; Rob and Fishman
2005; Bar-Isaac and Tadelis 2008; Arkolakis 2010; Dinlersoz and Yorukoglu 2012; Drozd
and Nosal 2012; Perla 2013; Gourio and Rudanko 2014; Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson
2016).2 Consumers lack the information they need to switch to better quality/lower priced
products, but they gain that information through various communication or search

In addition to the slowdown in reallocation shown by Decker et al. (2020), Andrews et al. (2016) and Akcigit
and Ates (2021) find evidence of a declining rate of diffusion with far-ranging effects.
1

Another set of papers models firm growth as the result of firms learning about their productivities over time
(Jovanovic 1982; Ericson and Pakes 1995; Hopenhayn 1992). Given the productivity realization, growth is
determined, so these models do not explain factors that affect the relationship between productivity and
growth.
2
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mechanisms. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2016) implement one of these models in
microdata.3 In their model, firm demand is a function of the firm’s past customer base, but
they do not model a specific mechanism.
Our model accommodates a variety of possible mechanisms—word-of-mouth, trialand-error search, and advertising. Under some assumptions, the surplus that consumers gain
from a firm’s product is homomorphic to that firm’s revenue productivity. This means that
the consumer’s choice over which firm offers greater consumer surplus (higher quality at
lower price) can be recast as a choice over which firm has higher revenue productivity. This
allows us to relate the level of lagged firm revenue productivity to firm sales growth. While
many standard models relate the change in productivity—productivity shocks—to firm
growth, our model relates the lagged level of revenue productivity and firm growth, which is
critical for understanding reallocation.
Furthermore, our model identifies several factors that affect the response of firm
growth to productivity, including firm market share, the overall dispersion of productivity,
and firm investments in product differentiation. It is straightforward to implement our
model empirically. We find that each of these factors is economically and statistically
significant. Indeed, they can account for about half of the decline in the rate at which firms
grow in response to high productivity since 2000. Each of these factors can be related to
market competition conditions, suggesting that considerations of productive reallocation
might be important in antitrust analysis. In particular, we show that under some conditions,

A related literature looks at the links between productivity and firm survival (Syverson 2004; Foster,
Haltiwanger, and Krizan 2006; Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson 2008).
3
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industries with higher Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration indexes will tend to have slower
productivity-enhancing reallocation.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we build a model of
slow adjustment of demand that relates revenue productivity to subsequent firm growth.
This model identifies several firm and industry characteristics that affect the rates at which
firms grow. Second, we test key predictions of the model empirically, finding both statistical
and economic significance. In particular, the model can account for much of the decline in
reallocation identified by Decker et al. (2020). Third, the model relates industry
concentration to the rate at which reallocation increases aggregate productivity. This has
important implications for competition policy.

Model
Our model aims to explore how firms grow based on their productivities when
demand is subject to communication or search frictions. The basic setup it this: consumers
have price information on all products in the market, but they lack information on the
quality of products that they have not consumed. A learning process conveys information
about a new product to some, but not all, consumers each year. This learning process could
take the form of word-of-mouth communication, trial-and-error search, or advertising
communication. Once informed about the quality of another firm’s product, consumers
compare the consumer value offered by the new product relative to their current product.
They switch if the new product has superior consumer surplus.
Specifically, there are N firms in an industry, each making a single competing
product of differing quality. Firm i has product quality 𝑄𝑖 . We initially assume that there are

5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3862796

identical consumers, of mass 1. Each consumer selects a firm and purchases the good of
only that firm in varying quantities.
There are two periods. In period 1, consumers have been pre-assigned to a firm by
some historical process so that firm i has a share of consumers of 𝑆𝑖1 . In period 2,
consumers can switch firms. We assume that while customers know the prices that all firms
charge, they do not know the qualities of all firms’ products. Specifically, we assume that a
consumer can know the expected quality 𝑄𝑖2 for firm i in period 2 only if: a) the consumer
purchased from firm i in period 1 and hence knows 𝑄𝑖1 , or b) the consumer receives some
communication that lets them form expectations about period 2 consumer surplus.
Communication
However, this communication process is constrained so that not all consumers
receive new information. We can model it in a variety of ways:
1. Word-of-mouth. 𝛿 pairs of consumers exchange information about their current
product choices by word-of-mouth, each member of the pair selected randomly.
If they currently consume different products, they will compare and the
consumer with the inferior product will switch.
2. Trial-and-error search. Manufacturers sell through retail stores. On average, each
retail store will stock products in proportion to the market share of the
manufacturers. Each period, 𝛿 consumers choose to evaluate a new product by
randomly selecting one from retail shelves (thus in proportion to that firm's
market share). If the evaluation favors the trial product, the consumer switches.
3. Advertising. Firms broadcast informative advertising messages at some cost.
Consumers receive multiple ad messages from different firms, but given limited
attention, 𝛿 randomly chosen consumers randomly choose one message they
received to select a product to evaluate. If firm i broadcasts 𝑚𝑖 messages, the
probability that a consumer who pays attention will evaluate its product is

6
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𝑚𝑖
.
∑𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑚𝑗

We assume, consistent with casual evidence, that a firm’s share of

advertising messages equals its share of period one customers, 𝑆𝑖1 .4
These models each generate an equivalent reallocation equation. In the word-ofmouth model, 𝛿𝑆𝑖1 consumers of firm i communicate with other consumers of whom
1 − 𝑆𝑖1 are customers of other firms. Thus, the number of pairs of consumers who
communicate with each other where one is a customer of firm i and the other is not is
𝛿𝑆𝑖1 (1 − 𝑆𝑖1 ).5 Note that these models make a critical assumption: once a consumer is
selected to receive information, the probability that the consumer receives information on
any particular firm is proportional to that firm’s share of customers. This property ensures
that the distribution of firms is not entirely dominated by small firms.
Consumption
Each consumer purchases a variable quantity from their chosen firm. Each
consumer’s demand is an isoelastic function of product quality and price, P,
𝐷 = 𝑄𝑃−𝜖 , 𝜖 > 1

(1)

yielding a consumer surplus of
∞

𝑉(𝑄, 𝑃) = ∫ 𝑄𝑥
𝑃

−𝜖

𝑄𝑃−(𝜖−1)
𝑑𝑥 =
𝜖−1

(2)

Advertising expenditures tend to average a constant share of sales over several orders of magnitude of firm
size (see, for example, Dinlersoz and Yorukoglu 2012, Table 1). In our data, regressing log advertising
expenditure against log sales with controls for industry and year, using a Heckman sample selection model to
correct for firm non-reporting and firm exit, the coefficient on log sales is .997 (.008).
4

For the search and advertising models, 𝛿(1 − 𝑆𝑖 ) consumers not currently at firm i consider switching and of
these, 𝑆𝑖 will consider firm i's product. At the same time, 𝛿𝑆𝑖 consumers from firm i will consider switching
and of these, 1 − 𝑆𝑖 will compare a product from another firm.
5
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Production
Firms produce output per consumer 𝑌 = 𝐴 ∙ 𝐾 where A is technical efficiency and K
is capital per consumer (or alternatively a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas
composite). Equating demand to output and inverting equation (1), revenue per customer
1

𝑅 = 𝑃𝑌 = 𝑒 𝜔 𝐾 𝜇 ,

𝜔≡

ln 𝑄 ln 𝐴
+
,
𝜖
𝜇

𝜇≡

𝜖
𝜖−1

where 𝜔 is (log) revenue productivity. We assume that both technical efficiency, A, and
product quality, Q, are pre-determined, although they likely result from past firm
investments.6 Total firm revenue 𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇 ≡ 𝑆 ∙ 𝑅 is related to total capital 𝐾 𝑇𝑂𝑇 ≡ 𝑆 ∙ 𝐾 as
1
ln 𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇 = 𝜔 + ln 𝐾 𝑇𝑂𝑇 .
𝜇
We estimate a version of this revenue production function below.
Total profits are the profits made on each customer times the size of the customer
base, 𝑆 = 𝑆(𝑃),
Π = 𝑆(𝑃) ∙ (𝑃𝑌 − 𝑊𝐾)
where W is the user cost of capital. We designate the customer base as a function of price
because the price that each firm charges in period 2 will affect how many customers switch
to that firm. That is, the firm faces a dynamic tradeoff between increasing the profit per
customer and increasing the number of customers in period 2. The firm sets prices as a
monopolist and the consumer is a price-taker. Equating demand with output and
substituting equation (1), the profit maximizing price for period 2 is (see Appendix)

Our model is purely a demand side model. In a more dynamic, long term model with supply-side
considerations, prospects for firm growth likely affect innovation incentives.
6
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𝑃̂ =

𝜇𝑊
[1 −
𝐴

1
𝜕 ln 𝑆 𝑃 − 𝑊⁄𝐴
1−
∙
𝜖−1
𝜕𝑃

].

(3)

The term in front of the brackets is the standard result from static optimization (ignoring
growth of the customer base) where 𝜇 is the average markup. The second term in brackets
represents the discount that firms offer to keep current customers and to attract new ones.
Evidence suggests that firms do indeed offer lower prices in order to induce growth (Foster,
Haltiwanger, and Syverson 2016).
The discount makes it difficult to solve equation (3) analytically and it also implies
that productivity estimates will be biased. Fortunately, some evidence suggests that these
discounts are not large. In a careful study of industries with homogenous products, Foster et
al. (2008, 412) find that industry entrants—firms that presumably offer the greatest discounts
because they have small customer bases—offer discounts of only 0.15% on average (3.88%
in a revenue-weighted regression) after controlling for productivity differences. For now, we
will assume that 𝑃̂ ≈

𝜇𝑊
𝐴

. Below we test for evidence of discounts, finding that their effect

on our main estimates is small.
With this assumption, using the static optimal price, we can write customer surplus
from equation (2) as
𝑉=

𝑒 𝜖𝜔
.
(𝜖 − 1)(𝜇𝑊)𝜖−1

This means that consumer surplus maps 1:1 to revenue productivity. That is, comparing two
firms, consumers will choose to purchase from the one with higher revenue productivity.
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Reallocation
We can now model customer switching. As above, 𝛿𝑆𝑖1 (1 − 𝑆𝑖1 ) pairs of consumers
exchange information on the quality of products they consumed in period 1. Based on this
information, they will choose the firm that has the highest expected consumer
surplus/productivity in period 2. To implement this comparison, we assume as a first order
approximation that 𝐸[𝜔𝑖2 ] is distributed uniformly in the range 𝜔 ≥ 𝐸[𝜔𝑖2 ] ≥ 𝜔 so that
1

the probability density is 𝑍 , 𝑍 ≡ 𝜔 − 𝜔. Variable 𝑍 represents the dispersion of consumer
surplus. This distribution is common knowledge.
We can then calculate the growth of firm i's customer base as follows. On average,
of the consumers of firm i who communicate with consumers from other firms,
will find better value at the other firm and these firm i consumers will switch;

𝜔−𝐸[𝜔𝑖2 ]
𝑍

𝐸[𝜔𝑖2]−𝜔
𝑍

will

find lower value at the other firm, so those other consumers will switch to firm i. The
expected change in firm i’s customer base from period 1 to period 2 is then
∆𝑆𝑖 = 𝛿𝑆𝑖1 (1 − 𝑆𝑖1 )
Defining the mean productivity 𝜔
̃=

𝐸[𝜔𝑖2 ] − 𝜔 − (𝜔 − 𝐸[𝜔𝑖2 ])
𝑍

𝜔+𝜔
2

,

∆𝑆𝑖 = 2𝛿𝑆𝑖1 (1 − 𝑆𝑖1 )

𝐸[𝜔𝑖2 ] − 𝜔
̃
𝑍

(4)

and the expected growth rate is
𝑔≡

∆𝑆𝑖
𝐸[𝜔𝑖2 ] − 𝜔
̃
= 2𝛿(1 − 𝑆𝑖1 )
.
𝑆𝑖1
𝑍

(5)

The customer bases of high-productivity firms grow while those of low-productivity firms
shrink. This equation thus describes reallocation to higher productivity firms. The absolute
increase in market share for productive firms will be an inverted-U, that is, low for firms
10
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with small market shares, high for large firms (~50% market shares) and low again for
extremely large firms (close to monopoly). The growth rate, g, of productive firms will be
smaller for firms with large market share, 𝑆, and slower when productivity levels of firms are
more widely dispersed (𝑍). There are two intuitions behind this behavior: first, a firm with
large market share has relatively fewer prospective customers it can hope to acquire, so it
grows relatively slower in response to productivity. Generally, of course, firm growth rates
are seen to decline with firm size (see, for example, Jovanovic 1982; Evans 1987). Second,
when productivity levels are dispersed, a firm must have relatively higher productivity in
order to attract the same number of new customers.

Heterogeneous consumers
We now relax the assumption that consumers are identical. When consumers have
heterogeneous needs, firms can make investments that differentiate their products and
services. Firms can invest in R&D to make distinctive product characteristics, they can invest
in information technology to increase the variety of goods or product features to meet
disparate wants, they can advertise to appeal to certain consumers’ distinctive identities, or
they can add locations closer to consumers, shortening travel distance. Since Hotelling
(1929), travel costs are a useful way to model consumer heterogeneity.
In the context of our model, consumers now choose between firms based on both
the consumer surplus they derive from their purchases and on their travel costs. Suppose that
firm j has made an investment that places them “closer” to consumers so that travel costs
are x less to firm j. Then a consumer will choose firm j over firm i if 𝐸[𝜔𝑖1 ] < 𝐸[𝜔𝑗1 ] + 𝑥.
Because consumer utility now has two dimensions—the consumption of goods and travel
costs—consumers might actually prefer to consume less at firm j if the savings in travel costs

11
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are large enough. Revenue productivity is no longer a sufficient indicator of switching
decisions.
Suppose the share of firms investing in locating closer to consumers is 𝜆. These
firms are randomly drawn from the original productivity distribution and their effective
productivity increases by x. Then, if the firms offering inducements are randomly selected,
the growth equation for firm i that doesn’t offer the inducement is
∆𝑆𝑖 = 2𝛿𝑆𝑖1 (1 − 𝑆𝑖1 )

𝐸[𝜔𝑖2 ] − 𝜔
̃ − 2𝜆𝑥
𝑍

Not surprisingly, these investments slow the growth of other firms. To the extent that large
firms have an advantage in this regard, these investments will tend to slow the grow of
smaller firms. To the extent that these investments do not change productivity, they are
sometimes called “business stealing” activities. Below we will test for evidence of firm
investments altering consumer choices of firms.

Empirical implementation
We estimate a version of (5) in two steps. First, we obtain estimates of firm
productivity each year, 𝜔
̂𝑖𝑡 , with the method of Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) using a
value-added production function with labor, net tangible capital, and intangible capital as
factor inputs. Second, using the growth in total revenues as a proxy for the growth in
customer base and assuming an AR1 process for productivity, 𝐸[𝜔𝑖2 ] = 𝜌 ∙ 𝜔𝑖1, equation
(5) can be transformed to
𝑇𝑂𝑇
∆ ln 𝑅𝑖𝑡
≈ 𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝜔
̂𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑡 𝜔
̂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .

(6)
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where j is industry. This equation expresses the response, in terms of firm revenue growth,
to the level of lagged productivity. Additional terms can be added to capture productdifferentiating investments.

Aggregate productivity growth
Because larger firms grow relatively less than smaller firms of comparable
productivity, an industry dominated by large firms might perform worse in aggregate. We
can, in fact, show this to be the situation for a base case. Let Ω ≡ ∑ 𝑆𝑖 𝜔𝑖 be aggregate
(weighted average) productivity. Then the change in aggregate productivity from period 1 to
period 2 can be decomposed as
𝑁

𝑁

∆Ω ≡ Ω2 − Ω1 = ∑ ∆𝑆𝑖 𝜔𝑖1 + ∑ ∆𝜔𝑖 𝑆𝑖2 .
𝑖=1

𝑖=1

The first term represents the contribution of between-firm changes; the second term
represents the within-firm changes in productivity. The second term depends on the
correlation between firm productivity growth and firm size. A substantial literature looks at
whether large firms are more or less innovative than small firms (see for example Cohen
2010) with somewhat mixed results. The first term captures the reallocation process we
study here. Using equation (4) we have,
𝑁

𝑁

𝑖=1

𝑖=1

2𝛿𝜌
∑ ∆𝑆𝑖 𝜔𝑖1 =
∑ 𝑆𝑖1 (1 − 𝑆𝑖1 )(𝜔𝑖1 − 𝜔
̃1 )𝜔𝑖1
𝑍
Assuming that productivity and customer base size are uncorrelated, (cov(𝑆, 𝜔) = 0) and
that sample means correspond to expectations, suppressing subscripts,
𝐸 [∑ ∆𝑆𝜔] =

2𝛿𝜌𝑁
𝐸[𝑆𝜔2 − 𝑆 𝜔
̃𝜔 − 𝑆 2 𝜔2 + 𝑆 2 𝜔
̃𝜔]
𝑍

(7)
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=
=

2𝛿𝜌
∙ var(𝜔) ∙ (1 − 𝐻),
𝑍
𝛿𝜌
√3

𝐻 ≡ ∑ 𝑆2

∙ stdev(𝜔) ∙ (1 − 𝐻)

where H is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index.7 Reallocation contributes less to aggregate
productivity growth in more concentrated markets (ranked by size of customer base).
This finding, of course, is not general; it is based on the strong assumption that firm
size and productivity are uncorrelated. If large firms become large because they are more
productive (Demsetz 1973), then productivity might be correlated with firm market share. In
that case, more concentrated industries might not have slower reallocation. Evidence shows
that labor productivity tends to be correlated with firm size. Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and
Scarpetta (2013), surveying data from eight countries, find the covariance between firm labor
productivity and firm share of employment tends to be positive, ranging from -.03 to .51, the
latter figure for the United States (see also Leung, Meh, and Terajima 2008). However, labor
productivity overstates the covariance between total factor productivity because larger firms
tend to be relatively more capital intensive. In our data, the covariance between firm revenue
size and labor productivity (revenue per employee) is .51, but that declines to .02 when
productivity is estimated with tangible capital and it further declines to -.07 when intangible
capital is included. This suggests that at the very least equation (7) applies in some industries,
although the covariance assumption must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

7

The last equation using the variance of a uniform distribution, 𝑍 2⁄12.

14
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3862796

Data and Variables
Our main dataset consists of Compustat firms traded in US currency with positive
sales, including firms with headquarters outside the US. The Compustat sample is, of course,
highly selected. However, by using Compustat, we gain rich data on firms, including
intangibles, that help test and validate our model, providing a foundation for research using
more comprehensive data. We use years 1976 – 2018. To identify industries in these data, we
use the historical NAICS (6 digit) assignments made by Standard & Poors, projecting
backwards for years before NAICS coverage. Because NAICS coding changes every five
years, we map these NAICS codes to the 2012 version for continuity. Compustat primarily
includes publicly listed firms and reported sales include all global operations. Revenues are
deflated using BEA gross output deflators for each two-digit industry. Our basic sample
covers 15,616 firms and 172,551 observations. See summary statistics in the Appendix.
We use two capital stocks in our analysis. Both are deflated and all are beginning-ofyear stocks. For tangible capital, we use deflated net property, plant, and equipment from
firm balance sheets. Peters and Taylor (2017) have developed measures of intangible capital
based on three components: knowledge capital derived from R&D spending, organizational
capital derived from Sales, General, and Administrative expenditures, and balance sheet
intangibles. Our results depend critically on including intangibles in the production function.
While the measure we use has been validated by multiple researchers (Eisfeldt and
Papanikolaou 2013; 2014; Peters and Taylor 2017), we also test other measures for
robustness (Appendix Table A4).
To compute firm productivity, we follow common practice (see Keller and Yeaple
2009), imputing intermediates and value added for the productivity estimates as follows:
intermediates is cost of goods sold plus sales, general, and administrative expense less
15
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depreciation less the wage bill. Where the wage bill is not reported, we impute it as firm
employment times the industry mean wage taken from the BEA. Value added is revenues
minus intermediates.
Our preferred productivity measure uses value added as the dependent variable in
the method developed by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015). This method corrects for
bias arising when firms adjust variable factors after observing their productivity. The
Appendix shows alternative estimation methods (Table A2) and results for our basic
regression relating sales growth to lagged productivity using these different estimates (Table
A3). While the magnitude of the estimated effect changes with productivity measures, all are
significant. Note that inclusion of both tangible and intangible capital is important for our
estimates. We also obtained data on mergers and acquisitions from Thomson Reuters SDC
Platinum database and matched these to Compustat.

16
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Figure 1. Binned Scatterplot of Firm Growth and Lagged Productivity. Controls for industry and year.

Findings
Growth Response to Productivity
If most firms have small market shares, then we can estimate an approximate version
of equation (6) as
∆ ln 𝑅𝑇𝑂𝑇 = 𝛼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝜔
̂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .
This simple relationship can be seen in a binned scatterplot in Figure 1 and is
presented in the regression in the first two columns of Table 1 with firm and industry fixed
effects, respectively. The third column of the table adds individual year effects for each

17
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3862796

industry to control for common industry shocks.8 These additional fixed effects improve the
fit but have only a small effect on the slope of the response curve.
One concern noted above is that dynamically optimizing firms may offer prices less
than the static optimizing price, tending to underestimate revenue productivity and to
overstate the slope of firm growth relative to productivity. However, we know that these
discounts decrease as firms build customer bases as they age (Foster, Haltiwanger, and
Syverson 2016). To test for distortions related to age, column 4 adds a term interacting firm
age with lagged productivity.9 The slope of firm growth relative to productivity does, indeed,
decrease with firm age, but the effect is not large, decreasing the baseline slope from .098 to
.092. This suggests that discounting does not have a major effect.
Acquisition might distort our estimates. The model concerns firm “organic” growth
realized by acquiring customers. To the extent that firms grow by acquiring other firms,
instead, our dependent variable is measured in error. Column 5 adds two measures of
acquisitions, the number of publicly announced mergers and acquisitions and balance sheet
goodwill, which captures the value of acquisitions net of book value. Both have significant
coefficients, but the slope coefficient increases slightly, as we would expect with
measurement error.
Another concern is sample selection bias. Firm survival might be correlated with
productivity, possibly biasing the productivity coefficient. To test this, we employ a
Heckman sample selection model basing selection on the ratio of long-term debt to the sum
of debt plus common equity and also on the independent regression variables. Presumably,

8

Equation (5) includes industry average productivity, which will change year-to-year.

9

Age is calculated, with some measurement error, as the number of years the firm has data in Compustat.
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firm growth is independent of the debt ratio (Modigliani and Miller 1958), hence meeting an
exclusion restriction. The Heckman correction increases the slope coefficient slightly (see
Appendix Table A5).10 We ignore sample selection in the remainder of the paper.

Figure 2. Binned Scatterplot of Firm Growth and Lagged Productivity by Top Four Firms in Each Industry
and the Rest. Controls for industry and year.

Factors affecting the growth response
Equation (5) suggests three factors that might influence how firm growth responds
to productivity: firm market share, the dispersion of productivity, and 𝛿, roughly the rate of
communication. The last is, perhaps, the most difficult to quantify. Broadly conceived, it

The sample selection regression is slightly different from the regressions in Table 1 because it analyzes
forward firm growth (next year – current year) against current productivity. Also, for tractability, we use 3-digit
industries rather than 6-digit. Sample size is different because not all observations have debt data.
10
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might capture switching costs, the extent of word-of-mouth marketing, or other factors that
are hard to measure. We do obtain proxies for the first two variables.
Although we do not have accurate market shares for each firm, we can identify firms
that have higher market shares than others, namely, those firms ranked in the top four by
sales within their Compustat industry. Compustat excludes most private firms and
Compustat industries might not correspond to the real industry one might want to use to
analyze firm behavior, but nevertheless, top four ranking should generally correspond to
higher market share. Figure 2 and Column 1 of Table 2 show, consistent with our model,
that the slope of the response curve is sharply lower for top-ranked firms.
Other factors might make large firms less responsive to productivity such as
diseconomies of scale. Column 2 interacts lagged productivity with beginning-of-year log
total capital (tangible plus intangible). Again, the slope of the productivity response is
distinctly lower and the intercept is higher for large firms. Column 3 add a measure of the
annual standard deviation of estimated log revenue productivity calculated for the entire
sample each year. This, too, is associated with a decrease in the productivity response.
Column 4 uses, instead, the standard deviation of each two-digit NAICS industry each year.11
The result is similar.
These results are all consistent with our model although the analysis is not causal.
Nevertheless, the effect magnitudes are substantial, suggesting that market share and
productivity dispersion are important factors for understanding firm growth in response to
productivity. In particular, both factors have increased substantially since the year 2000,

Because the number of observations varies dramatically across industries, we weight this regression by the
number of observations to reduce sampling error.
11
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possibly contributing to the decline in reallocation observed by Decker et al. (2020). From
the Economic Censuses, the market share of the top four firms ranked by sales in US 6-digit
industries grew from 26.2% in 1997 to 33.5% in 2012 (weighted by shipments). In our
sample, the standard deviation of productivity grew from .22 averaged over 2000 and earlier
years to .31 after 2000.

Figure 3. Binned Scatterplot of Firm Growth and Lagged Productivity by time period. Controls for industry and year.

Column 5 of Table 2, using a dummy variable for years after 2000, shows a decline in
the productivity response of .086. Figure 3 shows the equivalent decline in slope. How much
of this can be accounted for by increases in market concentration and dispersion? The
bottom row of the table sums the coefficient for each interaction variable times the change
in the sample mean of that variable before and after 2000. Combined, firm size and
dispersion account for between .033 and .049 of the decline. In other words, these variables
can account for about half of the decline in the response to productivity.
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We also tentatively explore the relationship between industry concentration,
dispersion, and aggregate productivity growth in equation (7). We calculate the productivity
for each industry each year as the revenue-weighted mean of firm productivities. We obtain
four-firm concentration ratios from 1997-2012 from the Economic Censuses, interpolating
intervening years.12 Leaving within-firm productivity change to the error term, we estimate
∆Ω𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗1 + 𝛼𝑡2 + 𝛽1 stdev(𝜔𝑗𝑡 ) − 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐻𝑗𝑡 ∙ stdev(𝜔𝑗𝑡 ) + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 .
in Table 3, with and without fixed effects. The 𝛽 coefficients have the right signs and are not
significantly different in magnitude. While our data do not include all firms and the righthand side variables are likely endogenous, the estimates are consistent with equation (7),
providing some preliminary support.

Product differentiation investments
When consumers have heterogeneous preferences, the model suggests that firms
may make investments in differentiating their products and services. These investments may
lead to “business stealing” that reduces the growth rate of other firms.
Table 4 explores the role of investments made by the largest four firms in each
industry on the smaller firms within that industry. The first two columns add means of topfour capital stocks to our response regressions. The last two columns breakout intangible
capital measures into R&D, organizational capital, and balance sheet intangibles (largely
goodwill). Investments by top firms in intangibles have a significant negative effect on the
growth of smaller firms. In particular, this effect appears to be dominated by investments in

This measure has some shortcomings. The Economic Censuses cover US domestic producers while the
Compustat data record global sales and we assign concentration data by the firm’s primary industry.
Nevertheless, we might expect the US domestic industry concentration to be correlated with firms’ actual
market concentrations.
12
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organizational capital, which includes advertising, marketing, and most information
technology investments. Large firms tend to dominate investing in these intangibles,
especially in information technology, and these investments have increased sharply since
2000 (Bessen et al. 2020). While firm size and productivity dispersion are linked to changes
in the slope of the productivity response curve, investments in differentiation are related to
the level. The bottom row of the table estimates how much these investments contribute to
the decline in growth of smaller firms by taking the difference in the mean intangible stocks
of the top four firms before and after 2000 and multiplying it by the corresponding
regression coefficient. Intangibles generally can account for a 3% decline in growth after
2000 and organizational capital a 1-2% decline.

Conclusion
This paper details mechanisms that helps explain how firms grow in response to
their level of productivity and how this response influences aggregate productivity growth.
We identify several firm and industry characteristics that affect the way firms grow in
response to productivity. While our empirical analysis is not causal, we find that these
characteristics have statistically and economically significant associations with firm growth.
Indeed, they can account for much of the decline in the response to productivity that has
occurred since 2000. This validation makes application of our model to comprehensive
longitudinal firm data a candidate for further research.
A broader implication of this analysis is that the rate of reallocation of resources to
more productive firms should be an important topic for policy, especially antitrust policy.
We show that firm size and industry concentration affect reallocation. While competition
authorities have focused on how competition affects innovation incentives, this paper shows
23
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that the translation of innovations into aggregate productivity growth is neither automatic
nor quick in many cases. We need to understand how policy can affect this process.
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Tables
Table 1. Firm Growth and Lagged Productivity
Dependent variable: Change in log revenue
(1)
(2)
Lagged log
productivity

0.121***
(0.012)

Age x lagged log
productivity

0.107***
(0.007)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.098***
(0.007)

0.092***
(0.007)

0.116***
(0.007)

-0.001***
(0.000)

Acquisitions

0.026***
(0.002)
0.009***
(0.000)

Goodwill

Observations
170,799
172,551
163,351
163,351
150,111
R-squared
0.203
0.037
0.162
0.165
0.176
Firm FE
Yes
No
No
No
No
Industry FE
No
Yes
No
No
No
Year FE
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Industry x Year FE
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table
shows the response of firm sales growth in response to lagged productivity. Productivity
is calculated using the Ackerberg, Caves, Frazer method (2015). Acquisitions is the
number of firm mergers and acquisitions obtained from SDC. 13

These data primarily consist of announced transactions. Public companies are not required to announce all
mergers and acquisitions; however, the list tends to include transactions that are materially significant or where
the acquired company has customers or suppliers who need to be informed. In practice, the number of
announced transactions far exceed the number of transactions reported to the FTC under the Hart-ScottRodino reporting requirements. We matched CUSIPs in the SDC data to permnos in CRSP to gvkeys in
Compustat producing over 100,000 matched transactions.
13
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Table 2. Firm Growth and Productivity by Firm Size and Productivity Dispersion
Dependent variable: Change in log revenue
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Lagged log productivity

0.112***
(0.008)

0.195***
(0.015)

0.280***
(0.032)

0.298***
(0.023)

Year > 2000 x lagged
log productivity

0.143***
(0.010)
-0.086***
(0.013)

Lagged log productivity x …
x Top 4 firm
-0.068***
(0.013)
x Log Total Capital

-0.020***
(0.002)

x Std. dev. of
productivity

-0.017***
(0.002)

-0.021***
(0.003)

-0.352***
(0.112)

x Std. dev. of industry
productivity
Base effects
Top 4 firm

-0.225***
(0.042)
0.179***
(0.033)

Log Total Capital

0.054***
(0.006)

0.047***
(0.006)

Std. dev. of industry
productivity

Observations
R-squared

(5)

0.058***
(0.008)
0.821**
(0.319)

139,387
0.132

163,318
0.163

163,318
0.163

163,302
0.172

163,351
0.162

Implied decrease in slope after 2000
Change in response
-0.022
-0.049
-0.033
-0.086
Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. All regressions include industry (6-digit)
by year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table shows the response of firm
sales growth in response to lagged productivity interacted with several other variables.
Top 4 firms rank in the top of their Compustat industries by sales. Total capital is the sum
of real tangible and intangible capital. Column 3 uses the annual standard deviation of
productivity for the entire sample; column 4 calculates the standard deviation for each
two-digit industry and weights the regression by the number of industry-year
observations. Productivity is calculated using the Ackerberg, Caves, Frazer method
(2015). The implied decrease in slope after 2000 is calculated by multiplying the
regression coefficient by difference in the mean values of the interacted variables before
and after 2000.
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Table 3. Industry Productivity, Industry Concentration, and Dispersion
Dependent variable: Change in share-weighted mean log industry productivity
(1)
(2)
Standard deviation of industry productivity
Industry four-firm concentration x standard
deviation of industry productivity

0.248***
(0.050)

0.567***
(0.090)

-0.130*
(0.075)

-0.461***
(0.158)

Observations
7,124
7,038
R-squared
0.053
0.156
Industry FE
No
Yes
Year FE
No
Yes
Standard errors clustered by industry in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The
data are Compustat firm-year data aggregated to NAICS 6-digit industries by year from
1997-2012. The dependent variable is the one-year difference in mean log productivity
weighted by firm revenue shares. Four firm concentration for 6-digit NAICS industries
comes from Economic Censuses from 1997 through 2012, with intermediate years
interpolated.
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Table 4. “Business-Stealing” Investments by Top 4 Firms
Dependent variable: Change in log revenue
(1)
(2)
Mean capital of Top 4 Firms in Industry
Physical capital
0.005
(0.003)
Intangible capital
-0.015***
(0.003)
R&D capital

0.003
(0.003)
-0.015***
(0.003)

Organizational capital
Goodwill

Subject firm
Lagged log productivity
Log total capital x
productivity
Dispersion x productivity
Log total capital

(4)

0.003
(0.003)

-0.001
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.002)
-0.011***
(0.004)
0.000
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.002)
-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.000
(0.001)

0.255***
(0.034)

0.235***
(0.036)

0.270***
(0.042)

0.254***
(0.043)

-0.015***
(0.003)
-0.220*
(0.128)
0.041***
(0.009)

-0.013***
(0.003)
-0.163
(0.135)
0.016*
(0.009)
0.046***
(0.002)
0.017***
(0.001)

-0.015***
(0.004)
-0.212
(0.155)
0.044***
(0.010)

-0.014***
(0.004)
-0.142
(0.161)
0.019*
(0.011)
0.048***
(0.002)
0.019***
(0.001)

105,629
0.035

98,185
0.061

75,957
0.038

70,152
0.066

Acquisitions
Goodwill

Observations
R-squared

(3)

Effect at sample means:
Intangible capital
Organizational capital
Change in firm growth
-0.0334
-0.0317
-0.0155
-0.0121
after 2000
Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. All regressions include industry (6-digit)
and year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample excludes firms
ranked four or less by sales within their industries. Table shows the response of firm sales
growth in response to lagged productivity interacted with several other variables with
controls for investments made by top 4 firms. Top 4 firms rank in the top of their
Compustat industries by sales. Total capital is the sum of real tangible and intangible
capital. The bottom row shows mean effects for top 4 intangible and organizational
capital as indicated. The effect is the relevant coefficient time the difference in means
before and after 2000.
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Appendix
Table A1. Summary Statistics

VARIABLES

(1)
mean

(2)
sd

(3)
p10

(4)
p50

(5)
p90

Log Sales
Change in log sales
Log productivity
Firm age
Log Net PPE
Log Intangibles
Acquisitions / year

5.313
0.047
2.672
15.677
3.564
4.423
0.442

2.278
0.373
0.248
12.710
2.647
2.217
1.248

2.492
-0.218
2.468
3.000
0.266
1.708
0.000

5.241
0.046
2.629
12.000
3.476
4.233
0.000

8.320
0.342
2.923
34.000
7.077
7.456
1.000

Means for Top 4 Firms
Log Net PPE
Log Intangibles

8.393
8.958

1.916
1.978

5.876
6.377

8.427
8.879

10.806
11.621

Dollar values in $2009. Age is years since first listing in Compustat.
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Table A2. Alternative Production Function Estimates
(1)
(2)
Dependent variable

Log employees (1000s)

(4)

(5)
Log
Revenue

Olley,
Pakes

OLS

OLS

Log Value Added
Ackerberg,
Levinsohn,
Caves,
Petrin
Frazer

Method

(3)

0.564***
(0.001)

0.560***
(0.001)

0.545***
(0.004)

0.552***
(0.006)

0.405***
(0.005)

Log Net Property, Plant,
Equipment

0.267***

0.311***

0.152***

0.290***

0.227***

Log Intangible Capital

(0.010)
0.196***
(0.002)

(0.013)
0.242***
(0.006)

(0.007)
0.303***
(0.006)

(0.004)
0.173***
(0.003)

(0.004)
0.183***
(0.004)
0.182***
(0.004)

Log Intermediates

Observations
188,539
188,539
174,130
188,539
188,539
R-squared
0.925
0.941
Number of groups
18,387
18,387
16,845
Standard errors are bootstrapped for columns 1-3 and clustered by firm for columns 4-5.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The first three columns correct for simultaneity bias
using control functions and productivity is estimated directly in the first stage. The last
two columns do not control for simultaneous adjustment of variable factors and the
productivity measure is taken as a simple residual that includes optimization errors and
other errors.
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Table A3. Tests of Basic Response Equation Using Alternative Productivity Measures
Dependent variable: Change in log revenue
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Ackerberg,
Value
Productivity
Levinsohn,
Olley,
OLS, value
OLS,
Caves,
added/
measure
Petrin
Pakes
added
Revenue
Frazer
employee
Lagged log
productivity

0.108***

0.069***

0.188***

0.105***

0.019***

0.002

(0.007)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

Observations
172,539
172,539
159,672
155,905
165,492
168,373
R-squared
0.038
0.036
0.052
0.049
0.034
0.037
Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. All regressions include industry (6-digit)
and year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table shows the response of firm
sales growth in response to lagged productivity. Productivity is directly estimated in the
first three columns but is calculated as a residual in 4 and 5. Residual measures combine
productivity with optimization and other errors, possibly attenuating the coefficient
estimates. To limit the effect of extreme outliers, we trimmed productivity of the 5% tails
in the last three columns.
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Table A4. Tests of Different Intangible Measures
(1)
(2)
Estimation
Production Function
Dependent variable
Log Value Added
Intangible measure

Composite

Separate

Log employees (1000s)

0.598***
(0.009)
0.287***
(0.008)
0.123***
(0.016)

0.607***
(0.003)
0.309***
(0.002)

Log Property, Plant, Equipment
Log Composite Intangibles
Log R&D Stock
Log Goodwill & other
Log Advertising Stock
Log Software Stock
Lagged Productivity

(3)

(4)
(5)
Response Equation
Change in Log Revenue
Peters &
Taylor
Composite
Separate

0.011***
(0.003)
0.034***
(0.000)
0.001
(0.001)
0.086***
(0.007)
0.120***
(0.009)

0.062***
(0.007)

0.045***
(0.006)

Observations
113,084
113,084
104,933
104,933
104,933
R-squared
0.049
0.045
0.045
Number of groups
13,604
13,604
Standard errors are bootstrapped for columns 1-2 and clustered by industry for columns
3-5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1-2 estimate productivity using the
Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer method. The composite intangibles measure is constructed
by first regressing Peters and Taylor’s log organizational capital on log stocks of
advertising expenditures, software developers, and patents. The exponential of the
prediction of this regression is then added to R&D stocks and balance sheet intangibles.
Column 2 includes separate stocks in the production function. For details on the
construction of these stock variables see Bessen et al. (2020). Columns 3-5 repeat the
basic firm growth response equation with productivity estimates using different
intangible measures and controls for industry and year. The Peters and Taylor measure
fits the data better and has a somewhat larger response coefficient, but results are
qualitatively similar.
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Table A5. Heckman Sample Selection Model
Dependent variable: Forward change in log revenue (t+1)
(1)
Estimation
OLS
Main Equation
Log productivity
0.090***
(0.006)
Observations
Censored observations
R-squared
Industry FE (3-digit NAICS)
Year FE

161,683
0.025
Yes
Yes

(2)
Heckman
0.094***
(0.006)
173,161
11,478
Yes
Yes

Selection Equation
Debt ratio
Log productivity
Industry FE (3-digit NAICS)
Year FE

-0.467***
(0.024)
-0.039*
(0.022)
Yes
Yes

atanh 𝜌

-0.534***
(0.030)
Heckman estimation uses maximum likelihood. Standard errors clustered by firm in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is forward change in
log revenue. Debt ratio is long term debt/(long term debt + common equity). 𝜌 is the
correlation of errors between the two equations.
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